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STRICT SCRUTINY

THE ROBERTS’ COURT TAKES A SLEDGE HAMMER TO
ASHWANDER AND CAUTIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE: CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION

Allen Shoenberger •

I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him;
The evil that men do lives after them,
The good is oft interred with their bones,
So let it be with Caesar 1
In this January’s decision of Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 2 the Supreme Court overturned more than 100 years of
legislative precedent, 3 as well as its own precedent of twenty years, 4 to
permit corporations to spend unlimited amounts of money on direct
advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for political office.5 The
breadth of the holding is startling. Although the specific context
• Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. © 2010.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2.
2. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
3. In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act, which was designed to prohibit corporate
contributions to political campaigns. 34 Stat. 864, 59 Pub. Law 36 (1907); see also infra note 11.
4. The Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
which had held that a Michigan campaign finance act that prohibited corporations from using
treasury money to advocate for or against political candidates did not violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 913.
5. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
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considered a video-on-demand ninety minute diatribe regarding
Presidential aspirant Hillary Clinton,6 the plain import of the holding
reaches all federal and state elections, presidential, congressional,
gubernatorial, judicial, and janitorial!
The sweep of the decision is simply mind-boggling! The only other
Supreme Court decision of such broad electoral impact is Buckley v.
Valeo, 7 which sustained in large part Congress’s campaign finance
reforms 8 designed to deal with the public perception of the electoral
shenanigans that led to the Watergate scandal. 9 That was an era in
which criminal break-ins occurred, not only into the Democratic
National Committee headquarters, but also into Daniel Ellsberg’s
psychiatrist’s office. 10 Ellsberg had leaked the Pentagon Papers, thereby
becoming an enemy of the administration in Washington.11 The public
was disgusted by such high level corruption, particularly that wrought by
invisible campaign expenditures 12 and political slush funds. Congress
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 887.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 23-28
Ryan Watkins, The Political Implications of 527 Organizations Necessitate Reform, 50
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 548 (2010) (citing Brandi Cherie Sablatura, Reformation of 527
Organizations: Closing the Soft Money Loophole Created by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, 66 LA. L. REV. 809, 818 (2006)).
10. On Sept. 3, 1971, the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg’s Psychiatrist, Lewis Fielding’s office,
authorized by top Presidential Advisor John Ehrlichman, was carried out by E. Howard Hunt, G.
Gordon Liddy and CIA agents Eugenio Martinez, Felipe de Diego, and Bernard Barker. These so
called “Plumbers” failed to find Ellsberg’s file. Pat Shellenbarger, Silent Witness Wrote History,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 15, 2006, at A1.
11. Liz Halloran & Scott Michels, Curbing the Press: Why the Government Hasn’t Been This
Antagonistic Since the Pentagon Papers Case, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, June 12, 2006.
12. Eight justices in Citizens United did vote to permit the requirement that corporate
advertisements must identify the sponsor, although Justice Thomas dissented on this precise point.
Justice Thomas has been recently quoted speaking at a law school in Florida. In a revisionist view
of history that would have made Cold War Soviet historians proud, he describes the initial federal
legislation prohibiting all corporate financing of federal elections as if it were a racist conspiracy.
Adam Liptak, A Justice Responds to Criticism From Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A17. In
fact President Teddy Roosevelt called for its adoption in his annual address to Congress in 1905:
All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political
purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use
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acted to remedy both the reality and appearance of corruption through
campaign finance reform, hoping to restore confidence in America’s
system of governance. 13
The methodology of the Citizens United decision is just as startling
as its holding, rejecting an anticorruption rationale.14 Not only is the
holding expansive, the majority opinion fails to even cite Ashwander v.

stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind
would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in
corrupt practices acts. Not only should both the National and the several State
Legislatures forbid any officer of a corporation from using the money of the
corporation in or about any election, but they should also forbid such use of
money in connection with any legislation save by the employment of counsel in
public manner for distinctly legal services.
President Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 5, 1905) (transcript available at
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3777). In the preceding paragraph, Roosevelt
repeated his call for a law regarding bribery of the electorate. To debase Roosevelt’s message of
anti-corruption by the unfortunate fact that the initial federal statute carries the name of a racist
senator distorts history and is, quite frankly, dishonest and unbecoming of a Justice of the United
States.
The Tillman Act of January 26, 1907 provided:
An Act to prohibit corporations from making money contributions in
connection with political elections. Be it enacted, That it shall be unlawful for
any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of
Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any
political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a
money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and
Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or
any election by any State legislature of a United States Senator. Every corporation
which shall make any contribution in violation of the foregoing provisions shall
be subject to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and every officer or
director of any corporation who shall consent to any contribution by the
corporation in violation of the foregoing provisions shall upon conviction be
punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand and not less than two hundred
and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or both
such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
34 Stat. 864, 59 Pub. Law 36 (1907) (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that no distinction is made
in the statute between direct contributions to a campaign and independent expenditures.
13. See Watkins, supra note 9.
14. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 908-09.
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T.V.A., 15 a case which describes a “constitutional avoidance doctrine.” 16
Ashwander articulates a policy of avoidance of deciding constitutional
questions, particularly broad constitutional questions, if the court can
fairly decide the particular case before it on other grounds such as
statutory construction, or narrower constitutional grounds. 17 It is worth
remembering that the first major declaration of unconstitutionality
subsequent to Marbury v. Madison 18 was Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 which
moved the struggle for the rights of slaves from verbal battles in
Congress to actual battlefields like Manassas and Gettysburg. 20 Broad

15. Justice Brandeis’ landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936), stated seven principles for deciding cases in which statutes are challenged on grounds that
they might be unconstitutional. These principles are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary, proceeding . . . 2. The Court will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it . . . 3. The Court will
not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied . . . 4. The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of . . . 5. The
Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by it . . . 6. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits . . . 7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.
Id. (citations, internal quotations, and footnotes omitted).
16. Some scholars trace the doctrine back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”). See
William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions As a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL
L.REV. 831, 837 & n. 23 (2001).
17. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
20. See Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97
(2007). “Dred Scott may not have been a sufficient cause of the War, or the only cause, but it was a
cause, a major cause, and in the minds of Americans then it was at the very eye of the storm.” Id. at
139.
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constitutional decisions are the nuclear weapons of the judicial arsenal,
and just as dangerous. The Roberts five appear oblivious.
Citizens United flatly ignores the teaching of constitutional
modesty set forth in Ashwander. 21 The decision similarly ignores the
caution of Justice Jackson in regard to the use of the Due Process clauses
of the U.S. Constitution: “Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on
due process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct
which many people find objectionable.” 22 A decision based on the First
Amendment, as Citizens United is, similarly leaves conduct ungoverned
and ungovernable by both Congress and the States. 23 Constitutional
modesty “[p]rinciples rest on more than the fussiness of judges. They
reflect the conviction that under our constitutional system courts are not
roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the
Nation’s laws.” 24
Instead of narrow construction, the Citizens United Court reached
out and dealt with the case as if it presented an “unconstitutional on its
face” attack—a ground withdrawn at the three judge district court
level 25—in favor of a narrower “unconstitutional as applied” attack. 26 In
my forty years of teaching constitutional law I cannot remember another
Supreme Court decision that did anything similar to this. 27 In many,
many decisions the court has converted “on the face” attacks into “as

21. See 297 U.S. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
22. Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
23. See id.
24. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973).
25. Citizens United stipulated at the District Court level to dismissing Count 5 of its
complaint, which raised a facial challenge to the act. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 892. As the
dissenting opinion notes, this dismissal meant that a record was not developed in the district court
on the actual effects of the statute. “The Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scapel
when it strikes down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the way that corporations
and unions play in electoral politics.” Id.at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 892.
27. Even Bush v. Gore did not quite reach as far, although the “tone” may not be all that
dissimilar.
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applied” attacks, but never in the opposite direction.28 Facial attacks in
First Amendment cases ordinarily require “substantial overbreadth,” 29 a
requirement first articulated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma. 30 However, the
Supreme Court later observed that:
Broadrick examined a regulation involving restrictions on political
campaign activity, an area not considered “pure speech,” and thus it
was unnecessary to consider the proper overbreadth test when a law
arguably reaches traditional forms of expression such as books and
films. As we intimated in Broadrick, the requirement of substantial
overbreadth extended “at the very least” to cases involving conduct
plus speech. 31

28. According to Marc E. Isserles:
It is well-established that a litigant has the primary responsibility for controlling
the contours of his or her constitutional case through the claims asserted in the
complaint . . . [A] court should only invalidate a statute on its face if the litigant’s
constitutional challenge can fairly be identified as a valid rule facial challenge.
Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48
AM. U. L. REV. 359, 425-26 (1998).
29. Moreover, “[without] a substantial overbreadth limitation, review for overbreadth would
be draconian indeed. It is difficult to think of a law that is utterly devoid of potential for
unconstitutionality in some conceivable application.” Harvard Law Review Association, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, n.61 (1970). Overbreadth challenges are
only one type of facial attack. A person whose activity may be constitutionally regulated
nevertheless may argue that the statute under which he is convicted or regulated is invalid on its
face. See, e. g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949). However, the Supreme Court
in Terminiello was clear that that actual challenge by the petitioner was to the ordinance as
construed and as applied to him. Id. at 3.
30. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The statute challenged in Broadrick prohibited state employees from
soliciting or receiving political contributions, becoming a candidate for paid public office, being a
member of a political party’s committee or of a political club, or taking part in the management or
affairs of any political party or in any political campaign, except to express an opinion and to cast a
vote. Id. The Court found it “not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoint . . . .
[R]ather, [it] seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner.” In effect,
the price of employment in the civil service of Oklahoma was curtailment of speech and action in
the sphere of electoral politics. Id. at 616.
31. New York v Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982) (sustaining a New York law criminalizing
child pornography) (emphasis added).
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Under this rationale, Citizens United is wrongly decided. 32 Even
Justice Black, the staunchest defender of free speech rights ever to sit on
the Court, was sensitive to the argument that absolute speech had its
limits. In a biography of his father, Hugo Black, Jr. recounts that his
father observed that a labor picket sign was “more than pure
expression,” it was “a two by four with air holes cut in the sign.” 33 “Is
that speech?” he asked skeptically. 34 Today this might be called speech
plus!
In Buckley, the Court invalidated restrictions on individual, noncoordinated expenditures to advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate because, “[u]nlike contributions, such independent
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s
campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.”35 Today, it is quite
clear that the Buckley rationale blinks reality. Even the underdeveloped
record in Citizens United makes it clear that the Buckley decision
fundamentally misunderstood the real world of election campaigning.
Today, Members of Congress are notified about such “independent
expenditures” made by corporations and labor unions as soon as the
advertisements air. 36 Members of Congress are particularly grateful
when negative issue advertisements run because it allows them to run
positive announcements and appear “above the fray.” 37 Today, the
potential for both the occurrence and the appearance of corruption are
quite obvious. Instead of time undermining the decisions that the court
overruled in Citizens United, a good argument can be made that the

32. See id. at 771.
33. Hugo Black Jr., My Father, A Remembrance, 185 (Random House 1975).
34. Id.
35. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
36. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 962 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 623 (D.D.C. 2003)).
37. Id.
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underpinnings of the relevant part of Buckley have themselves been
undermined instead. 38
The dissenting justices point out three of the narrower grounds that
could have been used by the majority, but were rejected. These include:
1. The video-on-demand feature-length film could have been
ruled
not
to
qualify
as
an
“electioneering
communication.” 39
2. The court could have expanded an exemption recognized in
an earlier case to cover non-profits that accept only a de
minimus amount of money from for-profit corporations. 40
3. The court could have applied unconstitutional as-applied
scrutiny, precisely because Citizens United resembled
organizations the Supreme Court exempted from regulation
in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc. 41
There were other potential grounds available as well. For example,
the court considered only the application of the Federal Election
Commission regulations for the time period thirty days prior to a
primary election.42 Speech prior to this limited period was unaffected,
as was speech through alternative mechanisms such as Political Action

38. Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United correctly points out that the majority opinion
did not even attempt to suggest exceptional circumstances justifying the court reaching questions
not presented to the court or passed on by the court below. Id. at 960.
39. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The video-on-demand feature
refers to the requirement that the ninety-minute video advocating Hillary Clinton’s defeat was to
have been posted on a cable television site, which required payment of $1 million for the posting,
but then viewers would have been able to see the video without charge. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 937-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986)). The dissent also mentions in a footnote
yet another ground, briefed vigorously by the National Rifle Association as amicus curiae, arguing
that nonprofit corporate financing of electioneering communications should be permitted to the
extent that the money can be traced back to individual contributions, a brief described as “arguing
forcefully that this is indeed what Congress intended.” Id. at 937 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 876.
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Committees. 43 The majority portrayed their decision as a blow
liberating speech,44 although in many alternative ways the very speech
implicated had many other places, times, and manners in which it could
have been communicated. Treatment of the regulations as time, place,
and manner regulations would almost certainly have resulted in
sustaining the regulations. 45 Were that unsatisfactory, the court would
have also had the option of invalidating various regulations, and need
never have reached the issue of statutory constitutionality.
Another alternative decision ground would have been a simple
remand to the Federal Election Commission for further rulemaking to
elucidate its views on video-on-demand distribution. The majority
opinion rejected a belated argument from Citizens United that the videoon-demand feature precluded the film from qualifying as an election
communication because its message would only be delivered to those
households requesting it. 46 Instead of how many people actually
received it, the majority said the determinant factor was the number of
subscribers who could possibly see it.47 The Court could simply have
held this regulation unconstitutional as applied and/or vague when
applied to video-on-demand systems—systems not explicitly discussed
in the Federal Election Commission regulations or the associated
commentary. 48

43. Id. at 887.
44. “[T]he Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political
speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.” Id. at 892.
45. “Time, place, and manner” regulations are only subject to intermediate scrutiny, and thus
need not be as narrowly tailored, nor be the “least restrictive means” of achieving the particular
objective. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
46. The majority argued that Hillary was not “publicly distributed” because a video-ondemand transmission is only sent to a requesting cable converter box. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at
888-89.
47. Id. at 889 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)((3)(ii) (2009)). The entire cable system had 34.5
million subscribers. Indeed, as suggested below, were the video a book, it would not be covered,
whether or not it was contained in a million-volume research library or not.
48. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (2009).
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Indeed, the definition of electioneering communications excludes
all print media, including magazines as well as electronic mail—forms
of communication far more analogous to video-on-demand than ordinary
broadcast media, the primary aim of the regulatory scheme. 49 It is
indeed ironic that the ninety-minute Hillary Clinton special could have
been mounted on many free Internet sites and made available for
streaming, with no payment whatsoever. Thus, the entire point of what
Citizens United attempted, payment of a million dollars to obtain access
to a market for distribution, might be described by young Americans as
an antiquarian exercise, about as reflective of modern society as the
wind-up victrola or eight track tapes The underlying injury in Citizens
United seems quaint in an era of iPads, iPods, iPhones, and Blackberrys.
Finally, methodological criticism of the Citizens United decision
might also make reference to its cavalier treatment of the Court’s recent
decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 50 Caperton held that Due
Process required recusal of a judge whose election to the state supreme
court was traceable to campaign expenditures of $3 million by a coal
company with a pending case before the court involving a $50 million
damage award. 51 The Citizens United majority described Caperton as
only implicating Due Process rights. 52 The opinion thus sidestepped the
practical fact that its decision in Citizens United encourages other
litigants to do precisely the same thing, distorting the justice system by
buying the elections of “right-thinking judges.” Furthermore the court
did not consider whether the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment 53 might also have constitutional relevance to First
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, the Due Process guarantee is
normally described as being related to fair process, and indeed, to
justice. What fairer process in the judicial arena can there be than judges
who are not corrupted by an electoral system dominated by substantial
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(1).
129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
Id.
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 910.
Caperton considered the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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financial interests? Indeed, what fairer process in the legislative arena
can there be than that achieved by an uncorrupted electoral system?
Should the holding of Caperton not relate back quite directly to the
ability of Congress to secure fair elections?
One might suggest that the practical impact of Citizens United was
not only to overrule the Court’s decisions in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce 54 and part of its decision in McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, 55 but includes sub rosa overruling of
Caperton itself. 56
Hugo Black Jr. declares: “[I]t can be fairly said that until [Justice
Black] was appointed to the Supreme Court and the conservative-liberal
balance changed, that institution was used by the privileged to put the
underprivileged back in their place.” 57 Is it unfair to suggest that both in
substance and in methodology, Citizens United has restored a variant of
governance by judicial fiat last seen from the conservative cohort of
justices during the high water mark of substantive due process and
Lochner v. New York? 58 There is irony indeed in the fact that President
Theodore Roosevelt called for restrictions on corporate campaign
expenditures the very same year Lochner was decided!59 Are we
54. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
55. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
56. It is also worth noting that the Citizens United majority did not consider it necessary to
justify its overruling of previous constitutional decisions by reference to the standards for such
overrulings. As Justice O’Connor wrote in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey:
Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and
add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned
doctrine, or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification . . .
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citations
omitted).
57. Black Jr., supra note 33 at 182.
58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
59. See id; supra note 12.
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doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past by enduring a similar cycle of
judicial activism? The judicial activism embodied in Citizens United
yields no happy answer to this fearful scenario.
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